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Paul and the Preachers

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The Meadville General Catalogue

Two Hymns of Thanksgiving

Arthur Newell Moore

Elizabeth Glass

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
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Paul and the Preachers

PROFESSOR CLAYTON R. BOWEN, TH. D.

The editor of the MEADVILLE JOURNAL has declared it the duty of the librarian-in-charge at the School to say something about recent books, especially in the field of New Testament studies, which might be of possible interest or profit to the preachers who form so large an element in the JOURNAL's subscription list. This mandate betrays less than editorial infallibility. While it is undoubtedly true that the professional duties of the librarian are such as to give him more opportunities than come to most other folk to become familiar with books, it is equally true that the familiarity he thus acquires is of necessity chiefly external. It is the book as an article of commerce, as the subject of statistical record, that he comes to know, not the book as an efflorescence of the human spirit, certainly not the book as the stimulant of preachers. He deals with title, author, publisher, date and price, not with the fires that burned while the author mused, or with the fluttering immortal melody about which he vainly cast his net of lovely mortal words. Preaching is the conveyance of personality from personality through personality to personality, and with the personality which books imprison the librarian may not concern himself. The counting of the prison bars is his function. And yet without the prison the personality could not be held and made to speak in defiance of time and space; this the meanest book can do. Without the net the visitant from purer skies would sing but to one raptured hearer.

There must be the librarian's book as well as the poet's book or the preacher's book, and one who lives long and familiarly with the volumes of a library may very easily come to feel that they are not so different after all from those other lodges of personality, men and women. Both have their external and statistical side, name, authorship, source, date, color of binding, size and shape and length. But both have all this only as an earthen vessel in which something real may be carried, that only real and only precious thing we call personality.

In the end it matters not so much whether personality make flesh and blood the vehicle of its self-expression, or whether it seize upon the more permanent and pervasive medium of the written and printed word. The Word become Book is often as great a motive power in things human as the Word become Flesh. It is very fitting that we call our Scripture by the simple word *Biblia*, books, for every book is potential Scripture, and somehow, somewhat, inspired. At the heart of it breathes a spirit, a personality: out of it peers, however timidly or stupidly, a human face.

Preachers, we said, are men of the book. They need a wider contact with personality than their housemates, their neighbors, their contemporaries, can give them. They need to listen to Plato and to Wordsworth, and Plato and Wordsworth are today just Books. They once were men; who shall say that they are not more widely influential as books than they were as men? So Paul is a handful of letters, and Jesus a smaller handful of evangelic tracts; but if Paul is *in* the letters and Jesus *in* the Gospels as they were once in their frail tenements of flesh, shall their evocation of new life in those they touch be less pure and potent than when they breathed and spoke? The book may die, as the man died, and the personality that lived in both cease utterly either to manifest or to kindle life. But books, like men, may rise from the dead.

Yes, the preacher needs books, not in place of human contacts, but as a means to human contacts fresher, more vital, more varied, more human than the world otherwise provides him. And no book, it may be, is without significance. One of the most whimsical of Dr. Crothers' essays is at the same time one of the most suggestive, that on "The Hundred Worst Books." There really is something to be said for these outcasts, and it is significant that it was a preacher who said it. Somehow in his hands these books were not so dead as they had seemed, they stirred and made little semi-human sounds. Dr. Crothers was an omnivorous reader, by the same token, he was the most human of preachers. This is not to say that reading makes the preacher. The bookish parson reads the librarian's books, the human parson reads books as embodied personalities. And the

conveyance of that personality, palpitating, creative, is his preaching. The best definition of preaching is probably that given by the old sailor to Father Taylor, "Preachin' is takin' somethin' hot out of your heart and shovin' it into mine." Unless it is hot out of the heart it isn't preaching. But it must first be hot in the heart, and that kindling is in great measure done for the preacher by books. While he is reading, the fire burns.

It is a commonplace, and like most commonplaces, only in moderate measure true, that in biography we come into closest touch with personality. A two-volume "Life and Letters" may leave us cold, while a sheaf of poems or essays may warm us year after year, like a brazier of glowing coals whose fire goes not out. But books of men, rather than books of things, are more certainly the preacher's resources. To take an example from the field assigned by the editorial bidding, writings about Paul or writings by Paul are apt to kindle homiletic fervor more than monographs on primitive Christianity, the apostolic age or introduction to the New Testament. Writings about Paul multiply. I know of no complete bibliography; it would constitute a library in itself! Was ever a man, save Jesus, so *be-written*? Many of the books are worthless, many are worse, but all are eloquent. Paul will not die, he will find voice and vehicle many-fold in each new generation. Men can not leave him alone even when they hate him, as not a few do, and in their writings he is not least alive, and tells his own tale of why he is hated. Men who love him indiscriminately often do him less service than these enemies who write a book. But he has wiser and more understanding lovers. H. W. Garrod says, "If the hearts of theologians were known, I fancy there would be found many who have inadvertently and unconsciously loved Paul more than Christ."¹ This is frequently because they understood him better, as a less simple nature more like their own. It is noteworthy that Auguste Comte, the anthropologist, calls Paul "*le vrai fondateur*" of Christianity, and assigns to him the eighth month in the Positivist Calendar, in which Jesus

1. *The Religion of All Good Men*, 1906, p. 110.

has not even a memorial day. That says little about Paul or Jesus, but is eloquent about Comte.

It has always been hard for even non-dogmatic writers to treat of Jesus as a real man, which is an impressive testimony to the power of the Fourth Gospel. It is difficult to see how Paul could have been treated otherwise, though the Acts of the Apostles started the process of transforming him into a Bible Character. Recent books, if they have done nothing else for Paul, have at least begun to make a man of him. When that process is complete, what a man he will make! Then he can swing triumphantly into his greatest missionary journey and really begin to win the world. Nothing can stop him, once he is free, once he is himself.

As a matter of fact, he did not move through the edifying pages of the Book of Acts, with its elusive map and vague chronology. He moved through bandit-haunted mountains passes and over great waters. Thrice his bare back took the nine and thirty lashes of the cat, a night and a day he was adrift in the deep. All that vivid perilous Levantine background, against which Paul's figure flits swiftly back and forth in our brief glimpses of him, needs to be re-created for us if we are to know him and the power within him that made him in all these things more than a conqueror. What he did has meaning only as we know against what odds he did it. The books are giving us Paul's world—and some books on his world tell us more of Paul than some books on himself.

We think of "apostle" as a Christian word, designating a Christian function. But it seems that the world was much apostolized in that first century; many an itinerant missionary, pagan or Jewish, was intent on its conversion. Paul, to contemporary eyes, was just another, a fact which was bane and blessing in equal degree. As God's husbandman, he had to plow a virgin field; he had to scatter his seed on ground often trodden hard by the feet of sowers who preceded him. The Synagogue was at once his *point d'appui* and the nest of his most determined opponents. The Jewish propaganda that had scoured sea and land in fashion quite like his own, to make

one proselyte, had made thoughtful pagans at once more receptive and more *blasé* toward his message.

All this background has just been illuminated by Frederick Milton Derwacter in a careful study of the work of the Pharisaic mission in *Preparing the Way for Paul* (Macmillan, 1930). This is a story which has never been told so fully or so well before, and the book supplies one of the missing stones in the foundation of our Pauline studies. Is there anything that will put life again into the pulpit of today more surely than the rekindling of the apostolic consciousness, the sense of mission, the conviction of a message to be borne for the lack of which the world is perishing? That conviction is as literally true now as it was for Paul, as it was for the synagogue before him. It is something other than the conventional motive of the foreign missionary societies of the nineteenth century. It is not so much an attempt to save souls as a spontaneous impulse to share a high privilege. Leave out the three verses that refer to the whale in the Book of Jonah, and see how nobly and tenderly a Jew may feel for the pagans and their need. The great tragedy of Jewish history, the shattering of the national life of Palestine and the scattering of the faithful throughout the world, was finely interpreted in terms of mission. So the first century *Apocalypse of Baruch* (1:4): "I will scatter this people among the Gentiles, that they may do good to the Gentiles." So again a third-century rabbi: "God dispersed the Israelites among the Gentiles in order that proselytes might be joined to them."

And proselytes were joined to them. The picture given in the book of Acts of the devout Greeks in attendance at all the synagogues where Paul preaches is truer to the actual situation than its somewhat stereotyped character might suggest. Jewish books in the Greek tongue and assimilated in some degree to Greek forms of thought were everywhere appreciatively read, to say nothing of the wide public reached by the Greek Old Testament. The *Letter of Aristeas*, the *Sibylline Oracles* (Jewish edition) and even the philosophic works of the Alexandrian Philo, were powerful propaganda. But the institution and the book fell far behind the living messenger in winning power.

There was a Jewish apostolate, which spread over the world and was chiefly responsible for the measure of ascendancy which Judaism won over the hearts and minds of thousands of thoughtful, earnest men and women. Quoting Cumont to the effect that "a great religious conquest can be explained only on moral grounds," Derwacter makes clear that "we can assign Judaism's great success as a propagandist faith to nothing else than to moral and spiritual elements, that is, to the satisfactions which she had to offer in the strictly religious field" (p. 135). We cannot wonder that when Paul and his colleagues came into the Synagogues and the market-places of Anatolia and Greece, offering with passionate persuasiveness all the religious satisfactions of Judaism—Scripture, lofty ethics, noble monotheism, a religious reading of history, a bright hope of a new world, a communal bloodless worship without temple, altar or sacrifice—with none of the distasteful racial or ceremonial limitations of Judaism—circumcision, restrictive food laws—we need not wonder that Paul and his companions reaped their greatest harvest where the Pharisaic synagogue had sown. By the same token, the synagogue propaganda was paralyzed from that day forth (other factors coöperating with Christianity to give its quietus) and became a tale of what had been done. But it is a tale without which the New Testament is unintelligible and our preachers would do well to listen to Derwacter and others who tell it again today.

The Gentile background of Paul's work is far more fully illuminated in our time than is his relationship to the thought and religious culture of the race of which he was the child. Indeed, in this field there is some danger that we may be blinded by excess of light. The man himself we shall never understand unless we understand him as a Jew, a Hebrew of Hebrews. Apt is the title of one of the most unconventional studies of Paul our library shelves contain, *The Invincible Jew*, by Harford Powell, Jr. (Bobbs Merrill, 1930). This little book one might at first be tempted to designate as *The Apostle Nobody Knows*, by a popular journalist. But that would be too vindictive. It is journalistical, at times with a vengeance. See, for example, the special cable from Jerusalem to the New York Times, tell-

ing how "Dr. Saul P. Tarshishian Attacks New Cult" and how "one Stephanos Pappapoulos, a ringleader, has already been executed—a firing squad is too good for such scum. Women and children are to be included in this clean-up." But not all is of this sort. Rather fine is a vivid imaginative re-creation of the conversation between Paul and Barnabas, who had come to Tarsus to seek him for the work in Antioch (Acts 11:25). This scene (pp. 62-69 in Powell's book) makes both apostles for the moment very real, and it is not the only scene of its kind. Yes, Paul was a Jew and he was invincible. If he could have been defeated, the sledge-hammer blows which life gave him in scarcely interrupted succession would have done it. No smaller man could have stood up under it. But in all these things he was more than a conqueror. At the end he had the right to say, "I have fought the good fight—there is laid up for me a crown." If any words in the Pastorals are genuinely his, these must be. Unconquerable, and a Jew to the end.

But the world upon which he labored so valiantly was pagan. He did not so much bridge the gulf that separated it from his own, as ignored it. When reading such letters as he wrote to Galatia and Rome, it is difficult not to feel that in his own exuberant emancipation he for the time quite failed to realize the width and persistence of that gulf. How foreign and un compelling must his Scriptural and rabbinical argument really have been to the pagan mentality! Not in the full sense could he become all things to all men; the Jew in him remained invincible. All the more marvellous is his success in winning the allegiance of so many Gentiles. Surely it was in spite of his arguments, rather than by them; surely it was the triumph of the man in him. It was not as if he brought a wholly new answer to life's question, a wholly new value to craving men. No, what he offered was widely offered, by many teachers and cults of the time. We need to know of the *Religious Quests of the Graeco-Roman World*, as they are sympathetically and with full knowledge portrayed for us, for example, by S. Angus (1929). Here is a book about religions that is itself genuinely religious; every preacher will be softened and made more human by its perusal. It amply documents Paul's wistful comment as

he looked about Athens, "I perceive that in all things you are very much given to religion." Demand creates supply; there was no lack of sincere and often noble attempt to feed the soul and still its cries. Nor were these merely attempts; they frequently, and for many people, offered a large measure of genuine religious satisfaction.

By all means, add to Angus' book the fine treatise on *Pagan Regeneration* by Harold R. Willoughby (University of Chicago Press, 1929), and see how men, and women too, were actually reborn under the ministrations of mystery-cult and philosophic illumination of the path of life. Christian preachers whose excellent homilies, forums and clubs somehow fail to effect in men a rebirth may learn much from those old pagans as to how the thing may be done. If Paul and the Christians outbid them, it was not by re-defining the task, still less by the naïve procedure of stealing their rivals' tools. It was by bringing to bear a more inward and more vital dynamic. Dr. Willoughby helps us to see more clearly our own apparatus of regeneration by holding up to our view the best that the ancient world could do without Christ.

Among these pagan cults of regeneration none is more sympathetic to the Christian with his interest in moral achievement than that centering about the name of Orpheus. This is possibly the name of a real man who lived and served and died, and left a tradition and an influence. An eminent Italian scholar now sojourning among us so thinks, and presents the cult and what it did for men very attractively in an important book, *From Orpheus to Paul* (Holt, 1930). One could follow many roads and come out at Paul, and Orphism was one of them. It will do us all good to wander along this unfamiliar, almost forgotten pathway with Professor Machioro, nor can we withhold our tribute of genuine respect to the man who blazed the trail, and the men who, following, wore it into a beaten highway. We shall want to know more of Orphism and may turn gratefully to the clearer and conciser account in Willoughby's fine fourth chapter.

More material of this same salutary sort is offered by the very objective and dispassionate treatise of Shirley Jackson

Case on *Experience with the Supernatural in Early Christian Times* (Century Co., 1929). After reading a book like that, we can never again cherish the foolish notion that an admixture of the supernatural makes an ancient narrative, in the Bible or out of it, unhistorical. Just the contrary is true; it is precisely the supernatural elements which supply the verisimilitude and local color and guarantee the historicity. Not by dubbing "supernatural" this impact of something that seems to go beyond the ordinary contribution of ourselves and our fellows shall we read its secret. It needs sympathy more than a name, and is more likely to turn out a value than a metaphysical truth or error. Professor Case may serve us well by making us see it as one of the persistent and normal elements in human experience. To make a religion without it has so far defied the ingenuity of man, nor would a religion so made be a religion at all.

And the thing Paul was propagating was a religion. It had a modicum of philosophy, a grand but unsystematic theology, a lofty and imperious ethic. But it *was* none of these things, it was a religion. It irresistibly drew men into a society, and casually, as need arose, developed some frame-work of organization. But though it flowered in fellowship, and committed suicide when it denied its social expression, yet the thing itself was no coöperative quest for a good life but a commerce between earth and heaven. Paul is a saint, a mystic, a devotee, a man under divine enthrallment. Percy Gardner had hold of the stick by the right end when he wrote a score of years ago of *The Religious Experience of St. Paul* (Putnam, 1911). Even in his letters, where he is not trying to preach, but to answer questions and to settle parish problems, the religious experience floods in and masters his attempts at rationalized exposition. His logic may suffer violence, or it may be superseded altogether by a flash of unerring intuition that goes straight to the goal. His rhetorical composition is often wrecked; it is more often lifted into a grandeur and a power scarce equalled in history. Percy Gardner wrote again,² "It

2. *The Ephesian Gospel*, 1915, pp. 182 f.

is only the over-trained modern investigator who would think it necessary to try to bring order into the vast and rugged landscape visible to St. Paul. Ideas surge up in his mind and find expression, not as parts of an intellectual system, but as the immediate utterance of an internal inspiration." And again,³ "The Epistles . . . seem in many places written with blood rather than with ink"; their utterances "are usually so steeped in emotion that they cannot easily be analyzed in a dry light."⁴ That is why one who is a theologian without being a poet fails altogether as an expounder of Paul, while a real poet, even if he be not a profound theologian, will grasp the essentials. The *St. Paul* of Frederick W. H. Myers is, as James Hope Moulton⁵ once remarked, "a better exposition of the apostle than perhaps any commentary has produced." Let every preacher surrender himself to the feeling and the music of this great poem, counting none of his concern what theology it may contain, and he will for a moment touch the real Paul, grasp his hand, look into his eyes. It is an experience none of us should willingly forego.

So one aspect of Paul which the theologians overlook was obvious to Coleridge, who wrote of him as "a great gentleman." It is all the more notable, by contrast, that a literary man of our day, who writes more significantly of the beginnings of Christianity than many of the professional Biblical scholars, hopelessly misconceives Paul and fails utterly to see the gentlemanliness which is so large an element in the charm of the letters.⁶ Why should the man who sees into the hearts of Keats and Shakespeare with such clear insight be subject to such darkening of counsel when he turns to the letters to Colosse, Philippi or Corinth? But Mr. Murry has much enlightenment and provocation for our preachers: if he sends them to their New Testaments in search of that humor which he so cavalierly and mistakenly denies to Paul, even so he will not serve them ill.

Among the literary lives of Paul no one should overlook

3. *Religious Experience of St. Paul*, p. 4.

4. *Ib.* p. 47.

5. *From Egyptian Rubbish-Heaps*, 1916, p. 76.

6. J. Middleton Murry. See especially *Things to Come*, 1928, pp. 263-273.

Emile Baumann's moving and heart-warming tale.⁷ Trust a Roman Catholic to know a saint, a mystic, a devotee, when he sees one! Read this book, not as a rigorous exegetical critic, but as one who would a-wandering go, up and down the Roman world, in the company of a man in whose foot-steps a new world springs up as he passes. You will be walking a royal road to romance, a member of a conducted tour the like of which the world has not seen again, privileged to see the creativity of the human spirit in one of its intensest moments. It is a story Baumann tells, but what a story! And how it wins you, holds you! How it will force itself into your sermons, whether you will or no!

Don't overlook Baumann, you preachers who want "human stuff" and "the vital touch with men who are doing big things." When you lay the book aside, Paul will have become your friend, and you will care enough about him and his doings to work out the critical details for yourself. There is no lack of excellent books that will help you to do this, none more usefully than the modest but very scholarly monograph by Eleanor Wood (now Mrs. Whitman), *Life and Ministry of Paul the Apostle* (The Pilgrim Press, 1912). Any one of the standard *Introductions*, best of all Jülicher's, or Von Soden's *Literature of the New Testament* (Eng. trans. Putnam, 1906) will admirably serve the same purpose, and save the preacher the embarrassment of making in his sermon blunders about Paul and the New Testament which he would be humiliated to make about Lincoln or the Essays of Emerson. It is inexcusable if the preacher ascribes the philosophical views of Josiah Royce to William James or quotes Bertrand Russell under the name of Rufus Jones. Why should it be less so to speak of "Christ's own words, 'The Kingdom of Heaven is not eating or drinking, but righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy spirit,'" or to write, "Peter, after he had denied his Lord, leaving his garment in the hand of the young man who plucked at it in the garden, and flying naked, was not more panic-stricken"? These are real instances, chosen from a choice collection in the libra-

7. *Saint Paul*, Paris, 1925, English translation by Kenneth Burke, Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1929.

rian's note-book. The preacher's first business, if he is to claim the right to speak to his fellows on these matters, is to avoid such gross and ridiculous blunders as to his facts and his sources. Read a new life of Jesus, a new life of Paul, every year or two, to keep in touch with what is really being discovered by those who study.

The new critical book on the life of Paul which we ought to read in 1930 deals, to be sure, with only three years of this life, but those years were so creative and significant and are here illuminated by such a flood of really fresh light, that the whole career of the Apostle is re-conceived. No earlier "life" can stand. The book is *St. Paul's Ephesian Ministry*, and its author is Professor George S. Duncan of St. Andrews (Scribner, 1930). Here is not merely argued, here is seemingly proved, the hypothesis that during Paul's three years (Acts 20:31) in Ephesus, of which we catch only glimpses in the nineteenth chapter of Acts, he not only went through the long drawn-out unhappiness that produced the Corinthian correspondence (and in the view of the present writer, the Galatian crisis as well), but at least twice suffered imprisonment and faced the prospect of death. Out of these latter experiences come the prison-letters (Colossians, Philemon, Philippians and Ephesians if genuine), not, as has commonly been assumed, from Paul's detention in Rome, awaiting the issue of his appeal, at the end of his career. This notion is not new, it had been argued in one form or another, by a succession of books and articles these last thirty years. The present writer had presented it in summary form in 1920.⁸ But Duncan has so fully and convincingly worked this construction into the outline of Paul's career that it must certainly be accepted. Henceforth our picture must be reconstructed, and we shall take leave of Paul where the book of Acts does, and leave Romans as his latest extant letter. At last the prison-letters become intelligible and all their problems fall into line.

But the added clarity in the story of Paul's movements and in the understanding of the Epistles is not the chief con-

8. C. R. Bowen: *Are Paul's Prison-Letters From Ephesus?* American Journal of Theology, 1920.

tribution of Duncan's demonstration. It is rather that the presentation of a relatively complete picture of a definite period in the apostle's career enables us for the first time to measure with some adequacy the heroic stature of the man. Even if you are not able, as Duncan is not, to put the Galatian episode here, enough is left to excite your amazement. Read the critical reconstruction of the Corinthian episode with its letters, one at least written "out of much affliction and anguish of heart, with many tears," with its heart-breaking suspense, its agonized pleadings, its revelations of ingratitude and brutality as of invincible affection that would not let go, and you will wonder how a man could have come through it alive. This man came through it able to say, "I am filled with comfort, I overflow with joy, in everything I am of good courage. Though our outward man is decaying, yet our inward man is renewed day by day." Then reflect that the man who so writes is at this very time beset by external foes, who harass him with every malignant device to stop his mouth, who mob him, scourge him, thrust him into prison, condemn him to death, cast him to the lions in the arena.⁹ When by what seems heaven-sent intervention (the details are not known to us) he escapes this dreadful death, the persecution does not cease. Again he is imprisoned; he is cold, naked, starving, pitifully sustained by gifts from distant churches. Again he is face to face with death and again delivered by what he can call only a resurrection from the dead by the hand of God. And from that prison he writes to Colosse his counsels for a new-born Church which he has never seen, to Philemon his touching request that the runaway slave Onesimus may be kindly received, to Philippi his ringing challenge, "Rejoice in the Lord always! Again I will say, Rejoice!" Perhaps no single contribution yet made to our knowledge of Paul's biography has thrown into such relief the titanic dimensions of his soul as has the story of what went on in those three Ephesian years as it has now been definitively told by Duncan.

9. "I fought with beast at Ephesus," I Cor. 15:32, is quite certainly meant literally. See C. R. Bowen in the *Journal of Biblical Literature*, Vol. 42 (1923), p. 59.

But in these days that are witnessing the death of the old morality (whether or no a new one is being born) you who preach Christ and Paul must be especially concerned with the ethics of these founders of the faith. No theme of equal importance has been so neglected or when not neglected so betrayed. Particularly is this the case with Paul, who was supremely concerned with the problem of conduct. Either his moral deliverances were ignored in favor of an immoral theory of "salvation" which he never held, or they were exploited in flagrant defiance of scientific method by unintelligent piety or unintelligent revolt against piety. There is little to choose between the method of the Sunday School lessons of our orthodox youth and that of Mr. Murry or of Mr. Ignatius Singer, who ascribes to Paul a character "austere, narrow-minded, bigoted, doctrinaire, superstitious and intolerant," and charges that "he poisoned the springs of life and religion" with his gospel "begotten in anger, founded on deliberate untruth and established by a curse."¹⁰ These side-lights on the Sunday-school teacher of two generations ago, on Mr. Murry and on Mr. Singer furnish no illumination of the Apostle. He was more apt than Jesus at reducing the spirit to concrete biddings to meet concrete situations, but he was here as everywhere the man of the occasion. He settled problems as they arose. His letters (and the same must have been true of his oral addresses), "are full of detached moral exhortations. But no one should make of these scattered, detached sayings a Pauline 'system of ethics,' and we must most certainly avoid the mistake of saying that things which happen not to be mentioned in the letters 'lay beyond his ethical horizon.'"¹¹ Hence the more systematic treatises on Pauline ethics have hitherto failed to convince, and the more systematic, the less convincing.

Full of intelligent critical insight, stimulating, real meat for the preacher is the last chapter (under the title, *The Life of the Divine Commonwealth*), of C. H. Dodd's fine book, *The Meaning of Paul for Today* (Swarthmore Press, 1920). There

10. *The Rival Philosophies of Jesus and of Paul*, 1919, pp. 91, 200-202.

11. A. Deissmann. *The Religion of Jesus and the Faith of Paul*, 1923, p. 257.

is much that the preacher can use, also, in the last three chapters of *New Testament Ethics*, by C. Anderson Scott (Macmillan, 1930). Many a comment there is a sermon in little. Just because this is a brief book, content to make a modest contribution, it really offers a great deal, and in just the fresh non-technical form in which the preacher can use it. Here is nothing dogmatic, nothing artificial. On the much debated, and wholly gratuitous, problem of Paul's originality, and the zeal with which ethical ideas more or less closely approximating his own are discovered in other teachers and religions and set forth for comparison, Scott has sensible words (pp. 97 f.). "I could imagine that Paul himself would be very little disturbed by such discoveries. He was prepared to take ethical suggestions wherever he found them, in Moses or later Judaism, in Epicurus or Zeno, in the moral atmosphere of his time, and having tested them in the light of Christian motives and standards, to 'hold fast that which was good.' . . . Paul's great desire was to get things done. His great conviction is that he and his fellow-Christians possess in the Gospel something which is a 'Divine Force unto salvation.' And salvation . . . means the power to discover what is the will of God and the power to do it."

But the inclusive and detailed treatment of the apostle's theory of living is the new book by Professor Morton Enslin of Crozer Seminary, *The Ethics of Paul* (Harpers, 1930). There is nothing so good. Enslin writes like a human being, with humor and good humor, not more serious than his context demands, never a pedant, always the delightful friendly scholar. Here is a book that is not only a study of the ethics of a man long dead, but is a contribution to the art of living in the twentieth century as well. It belongs on the librarian's shelf not only alongside books on the New Testament, but alongside *Our Changing Morality* and *A Preface to Morals*. And since it is today the preacher's most terrifying obligation to say something that will serve in however slight degree as moral guidance in our confused time, he needs all the help he can get. From Paul as presented by Enslin, he can get much. He will find infallibility neither in the apostle nor in his expounder,

but infallibility would be the thing most useless to him. He wants the handclasp of a human friend concerned with the same problems as himself. He will be cheered by a comment like this (p. 130). "For Paul as for every other moral teacher who has made any real impress, the final authority was the light within. The standards he set were his own standards of conduct. . . . The sort of conduct which in Paul's eyes disgraced Christ . . . was the conduct that Paul himself loathed. Can there be a more ultimate authority?"

Early Unitarianism and the New Humanism

REVEREND ROBERT S. LORING, D. D.

The widening interest in the New Humanism, which, as expounded in its literary form by Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More and their followers, would unite cultivation of life on the human level with religious insight, raises the question of how far early Unitarianism in this country may be regarded as a preparation for this type of thinking. What chiefly determined and motivated the heresies of Unitarian leaders, theological doctrines or ethical and social ideals? Did they first change their theological doctrines, and then start to rearrange their social ideas to conform; or did they first broaden their views of human nature and social duty, and then try to bring the intellectual expression of religion ethically and socially up to date? Much attention has been given to their theological position, because the controversy with the more conventional religious beliefs was so largely along doctrinal lines. But in "The Rise of American Civilization," by Charles and Mary Beard, the early liberal religious movement is interpreted chiefly in terms of a new interest in social idealism. "When the crises," of the American Revolution, "came, Jefferson, Paine, John Adams, Washington, Franklin, Madison, and many lesser lights were to be reckoned among either the Unitarians or the Deists. It was not Cotton Mather's God to whom the author of the Declaration of Independence appealed, it was to 'Nature's God.' From whatever source derived, the effect of both Unitarianism and Deism was to hasten the retirement of historic theology from its empire over the intellect of American leaders, and to clear the atmosphere for secular interests."

Deism had started this work for secular interests by shifting the center of authority from a supernatural point outside to a natural point inside the world. It did this, not so much by denying the supernatural, as by merging it with the natural, by regarding reason as the same both in heaven and on earth. In "Christianity as old as Creation, or the Gospel a Republication of the Religion of Nature," published in England in 1730,

Matthew Tindal holds that nothing belongs to true religion "except what our reason tells us is worthy of having God for its author." Since reason is everywhere the same, "natural and revealed religion cannot differ, because what reason tells us is unworthy of having God for its author can never belong to the true revealed religion." The same position is taken in *The Christian Disciple*, the liberal Unitarian magazine started in 1813 in Boston. It states in its first number that, "we ought not to expect that we shall ever be called upon by our Creator to yield assent to doctrines which after deliberate and impartial attention clearly appear to contradict one another, or to contradict truths which God is teaching by reason and nature. The great question whether Christianity be true has been entrusted by God to the decisions of human reason." The assertion, this is so because God has so arranged it, seems designed as a psychological shock absorber, to lessen the jolt which the old type of believer might receive from this sudden shift of doctrinal authority from the decrees of the deity to the critical and moral reasoning of man. The duty of thus using reason to test doctrines is summed up in 1816 in the same magazine in this way: "Men may err who make use of reason—men must err who renounce reason." The idea that doctrines of religion should be accepted as being beyond reason, as "truths which are beyond not only human but angelic understanding," and so should "be believed by us as revealed by God himself," to use words of Thomas Aquinas, has been definitely abandoned.

In this critical use of reason, however, there was no thought of making progress in religion. The method employed may be compared to that of some cautious New Humanist, who critically selects what seems best in old traditions and beliefs, and then in decorous fashion exercises the will to refrain from everything which today seems suspicious because new. Much was written about the need of house-cleaning, about purifying Christianity from useless dogmas, but nothing about building a new doctrinal temple for faith. It was generally held that Bible revelation, freed from verbal errors, explained historically, properly interpreted, contained all necessary religious truth. Channing alone faced the problem of what a thinking

man ought to do if reason ever pushed beyond revelation. "Revelation is but a means, and is designed to concur with nature, providence, and God's spirit, in carrying forward reason to its perfection. If I could not be a Christian without ceasing to be rational, I should not hesitate as to my choice. I feel bound to sacrifice to Christianity property, reputation, life; but I ought not to sacrifice to any religion that reason which lifts me above the brute and constitutes me a man." Channing passed beyond the belief that Bible teaching was the final authority in religion when he wrote: "I am surer that my rational nature is from God than that any book is the expression of His will." Having opened the door for human reason, Channing was not willing to have it again closed. In an address to the theological students at Harvard, in 1826, he advocated complete freedom of inquiry. "Do not give him (the student) the shadow for the substance of freedom, by telling him to inquire, but prescribing to him the convictions at which he must stop." In religion and ethics a man could now be a humanist of the forward as well as of the backward looking type. He could expect to find wise standards of conduct in the social changes of the future as well as in the teaching of the best men of the past.

One would naturally suppose that a group of liberals, who started to use "reason in religion" as a test of the value of old doctrines, would go on to use the same reason to construct new doctrines. According to precedent they would go to work to replace one intellectual system, the orthodoxy of their day, by another closely reasoned system, more satisfying to the liberal metaphysical mind. In this case the movement of Unitarianism would not have been towards some undogmatic form of humanism, in which the exercise of free moral choice is united to religious insight, but towards a new kind of dogmatism. Yet the old theology was not replaced by a new. Reason was used as a sharp tool to clear away the theological underbrush; but the kind of ethical crop to be raised on the cleared land was determined by an appeal to what was best in a man's inner life and his social experience. Early Unitarianism was moved by a distrust of religious dogmas in general, and not

merely by objection to specific orthodox dogmas. Channing said that most liberal ministers "preached precisely as if no such doctrine as the Trinity had ever been known." O. B. Frothingham mentions one Boston minister who preached for nearly thirty years, from 1825 to 1854, without ever caring "to make any public statement in regard to the details of belief." William C. Gannett writes of Kirkland, first professor of theology and then president of Harvard, as being theologically "one of the most advanced of the silent brotherhood." Samuel Johnson, in 1849, declined to give up preaching politics, even though his church did not approve of a social gospel; but of theology he wrote: "Theology I am diverting from more and more every day. I am convinced that my mission is to go about scattering the seeds of moral growth." Among the list of Unitarian leaders of the last hundred years there is not a constructive theologian of even second rank. Emerson never claimed to have a system of doctrine. Parker was no more of a success as a theologian than was Channing. If anyone point to Martineau, in England, as an exception to the rule, the answer is that his biographer, J. Estlin Carpenter, describes Martineau as "the greatest English moralist since Butler"; and the work by which he will continue to be best known is, "Types of Ethical Theory." In his "Study of Religion," Martineau describes metaphysics as merely critical in its work, not as giving independent and original truths. The whole metaphysical "process wins at last, through all its dizzying circuits, only the very position which commonsense assumed at first." As far as constructive theological thinking goes the Unitarians have been the most *unintellectual* group in America, except perhaps the Quakers. The result of this studied refusal to take theology seriously has been that whenever any person asked: What system of reasoned doctrines do you as liberals offer in place of the reasoned doctrines of orthodoxy; no Sherlock Holmes has ever been able to find the answer. The path of intuition, of religious insight, a man's feeling of "some larger life upon his own impinging," as Lowell put it, has always been preferred.

The explanation for this growing indifference to dogmatic theology is that early Unitarianism moved along humanist lines.

Its critical principle was "reason in religion"; but its constructive principle was "character before creed." Instead of testing human nature by the creed, it was the creed that was to be tested by what it might do for human nature. Channing held that human nature "should be regarded with reverence rather than contempt. Our danger is that we shall think too meanly of it, not too highly." Religion should be of instrumental value to men. "Our great work as Christian ministers is to promote practical Christianity, love to God and love to man." The blessing of religion was natural rather than supernatural. "Expect from it no good farther than that it gives strength and worth to your characters." This character was not to be reached through a free and easy expansion of the emotions, but by a controlled choice of what is best. Here the ideal would satisfy those New Humanists who advocate wise selection and the will to refrain. But the ethical work of religion was not to be limited to the development of individual and aristocratic types of character, but was also to be applied to social groups. Channing prepared the way for that more robust "Humanism" which believes in social progress. "It seems to me that the signs of the times point to a great approaching modification of society." The end of the ministry should be "to set before men with great plainness the vastness of the change which it (religion), is intended to work in society and in individuals." Joseph Henry Allen describes what was going on: "Nothing is more characteristic of the early Unitarianism than this; that, in proportion as it departed from the old theology, it became committed to a generous faith in human nature, and more and more made its religion consist in service to mankind."

Humanism, through the wise use of selection and the will to refrain, may be a return on the part of the individual to what is of most value in the past; but it cannot be a vigorous and forward looking movement without this faith in social experiment and progress. What would have happened to Unitarianism as a whole if it had stopped with "reason in religion," instead of going on to develop new social types of character, is shown by the position held by Ezra Stiles Gannett, who in 1824 became the colleague of Dr. Channing. At the close of

forty years of preaching he testifies that he had made practically no change in his religious beliefs. He thus furnishes a mile-stone past which we may see progressive liberalism moving. Dr. Gannett was an executive type of man, an organizer of, and later secretary, and then president of the American Unitarian Association. It made missionary work difficult, if, just when you were ready to establish a new church, you found that some radical had come along and shifted the foundations, had given them a push towards reliance on individual experience and towards social experiment. As a youth he was for a revision of traditional beliefs, but, once changed, he wished the new and simpler doctrinal foundations to remain fixed and secure; revelation confirmed by miracles, and interpreted by reason, by which was meant Unitarian reason of a mild and unadventurous kind. So Dr. Gannett, having once settled down, no more represented a free, forward moving religion, than the reactionary type of the New Humanism, which seeks for a center of control in Anglo-catholicism, or in Roman Catholicism, represents any kind of a forward movement today.

What was lacking was the two optimistic beliefs which are needed for a courageous humanist movement. Dr. Gannett never shared the generous belief of Channing, Parker and Emerson in the worth of the individual; and so he could not see his way clear to shift the source of authority boldly from external revealed doctrines to the best found in the best men of all ages. In his old age he wrote: "I rely on an authority external to myself; for in man I see capacity indeed, but present weakness rather than strength. The radical error of our times, I soberly believe, is a false estimate of the powers and prerogatives of human nature. I think less of man and more of God—I have little confidence in human speculation, and more gratitude than I can express for Divine revelation." In the second place, he did not share the growing belief in social progress. He did not hold that in order to bring out the best in man you ought to change and improve the environment. He did not look to social experiment to organize and test optimistic views of human nature. Life needs some center for selection or of control; and since Dr. Gannett could not rely for such control upon

either the best in individual human nature or upon social experiment, he could only view with distrust the movement of religion and ethics away from the old belief in external, supernatural authority.

Dr. Channing moved so boldly out into the world of universal religion that he gave his younger colleague cause for worry. In 1840 Dr. Gannett notes in his journal: "Dr. Channing preached a sermon of uncommon power, but of doubtful utility, in defence and illustration of the doctrine that the glory of Christianity consists, not in anything peculiar to itself, but in what it has in common with the teaching of 'reason and nature', its most important truths being only clearer declarations of what had been whispered by other teachers. Even the character of Christ and the character of God, Dr. Channing thought, were excellent and glorious for what they had in common with other good beings than for any attribute which they alone possessed. The discourse was powerful and bold—but I doubt if it was not suited to do more harm than good." Four years later Dr. Gannett makes an attack on the then notorious sermon, "The Transient and the Permanent in Christianity," by Theodore Parker. He complains that when religion is represented as passing from revelation to nature it opens the door for new ideas. "Since Christianity cannot in any proper sense (according to Parker), be called a revelation, not only the possibility but also the probability of a further development of the absolute truth that has been made in Christ, or seen by him, may be affirmed." He rightly points out that religious intuitions of truth "are not in experience invariable," that what feels true to one person may not feel true to another. But he grossly exaggerates the moral dangers of this emphasis on personal experience, since he has no faith in a humanist discipline and control, through social experiment, and a comparison with what was best in man. "We hear young persons expressing a contempt for authority. A person who regards intuition as the highest authority should bless God if he do not die a maniac or a villain." Gannett here takes a slap at both Parker and Emerson, and shows where and how they had marched past conservative Unitarians. Near the close of his life, in an ad-

dress before the Harvard Divinity School in 1867, he regrets that "the modern style of thought, which makes human nature the starting point of religious inquiry and religious faith, has come into our Theological School through open doors." Like other Unitarians, Dr. Gannett recognized that, under the ideal of freedom, these new heretics could not be shut out of the School; but, he adds, "for the sake of the School, and for the gospel's sake, the control must remain in the hands of those who represent the original design." Even at that late day he still hoped that the movement of liberalism towards a humanistic interpretation of religion and ethics might be stopped.

Early Unitarianism, steadily marching past all those who held to an external and supernatural authority, agrees with both the New Humanism, of the American individualist type, and with the Humanism of the social service type, that revealed doctrines are not necessary to the good life. But in rejecting dogmatic religion this liberalism did not reject all religion. On the one hand, it would agree with Irving Babbitt: "Though I see no evidence that humanism is necessarily ineffective apart from dogmatic and revealed religion, there is, it seems to me, evidence that it gains immensely in effectiveness when it has a background of religious insight." On the other hand, it would not approve of the exclusive emphasis which the New Humanism places on the cultivation of the individualistic and aristocratic type of character. The New Humanist slogan, "Walk in the Middle of the Road," would have appealed to it; but it would not have limited this moral pedestrianism to a few superior persons, but would have expected that hundreds of thousands would soon learn to walk like dignified human beings in their very best style. For while the New Humanists seem to limit the dignity of human nature to Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More, and a few disciples, all other good humanists being long since dead, the early liberals believed that the divine in human nature was much more widely spread, though often overlaid by less desirable elements. So it would not speak contemptuously of social idealism, of humanitarianism, of progress, even though such terms have often been used in a too optimistic and uncritical way. It would heartily approve of the exten-

sion of duty to cover the working out of new and better social patterns, even though strenuous social reform often seems to mean: reform your neighbor as you might not like to be reformed yourself. So the development of Unitarianism points the way to a humanism of a rich, well-balanced, and inclusive type, which, while it distrusts theological dogmas, retains religious insight, the sense of some larger life upon our own impinging; and which, while it emphasizes the need of wise and controlled selection on the part of the individual, also stands for the control that comes through social experiment, and the better life opportunity for each and all that comes with social progress.

A Defence of Human Nature

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In the October number of THE MEADVILLE JOURNAL the present writer published an article entitled *The Challenge of Science to Man's Self Esteem*. That article began with a brief account of man's natural self-regard, of his sense of superiority over other creatures and of his tendencies to vanity, egomania and delusions of grandeur. It showed also how even religion brought about a vast expansion of man's ego, as may be seen in the language put into the mouth of God in Genesis 1:26,27. "And God said, let us make man in our image, after our likeness . . . so God created man in his image, in the image of God created he man"; or in the jubilant utterance of the eighth Psalm: "Thou hast made him a little lower than the angels and hast crowned him with honor and glory. Thou madest him to have dominion over the works of thy hand; thou hast put all things under his feet." The conclusion was reached that, in spite of pessimistic theologies such as Calvinism, "before the impact of modern science on the Western world, man had attained a conception of himself which, while recognizing the evils to which his nature was prone, was essentially optimistic, if not egotistic. He took literally the statement that he had been made in God's image; he considered the salvation of his soul to be the central motive of the cosmic drama; he projected his life without any hesitation beyond the grave into a future of eternal bliss or eternal woe."

The article then proceeded to show how this natural self-confidence and religious optimism had been challenged and in many instances destroyed by four movements of modern thought. The Copernican astronomy shattered man's easy self-confidence by destroying his belief that the earth was the centre of the solar system, by setting his puny existence over against the immensities of cosmic space and time and by representing his life as "a brief and transitory episode in the life of one of the meanest of the planets."

The Darwinian account of man's descent from the lower animals was still more painful and depressing. As interpreted by Darwin's more mechanistic disciples it seemed to level the highest to the lowest and attach little significance to those qualities which had always been used by man to justify his sense of superiority to the lower animals. Moreover, its social implications were represented as very inimical to the cherished dream of peace and justice among men. Natural selection was supposed not only to make cruel competition and warfare inevitable but also to justify such stern inevitabilities as in the interest of the higher selective process. The Nietzschean "Superman" seemed a natural outcome of the Darwinian biology and idealists saw in the "Superman" the blonde beast.

The Freudian psychology carried the disillusionment of Europe and America a long step further. In spite of his lowly place in the universe and his modest pedigree, man could still feel that he had a strong citadel of self-defense in his own deeper nature,—in his sense of decency, his capacity for disinterestedness and his spiritual sensibilities. But Freud and his disciples proclaimed from the housetops that, by the new method of psycho-analysis, they had unearthed unsavory facts about the real nature of man which, when frankly faced, would strip from him the last vestige of pretense and egotism. The Freudian doctrines of pan-sexuality and of infantile incestuous desire or the oedipus complex have made it very difficult, for those who have been impressed by them, to preserve the romantic and idealistic attitude towards human nature which was the mood of most persons of moral and spiritual culture prior to the twentieth century.

The Freudian psychology was a European product, but America has added her own quota to the agencies of disillusionment in the Watsonian doctrine of Behaviorism. That dogma, in its extreme form, proposes to cut the ground from under all the old idealisms, both religious and philosophical. It repudiates consciousness, purpose, creative activity, all psychological spontaneity, as insignificant if not utterly meaningless elements in human life. The entire inner life of man, which in all the spiritual religions was regarded as the *locus* of the real dramas

of human existence, is for the Behaviorist a mere cross-section of the environment to which all initiative belongs. If Behaviorism in its extreme form were proved to be true, it would be the final stage in our disillusionment, for it conceives human beings as mere puppets without any real initiative of their own and bound up with the fate of a universe which is mechanistic through and through.

The total effect on sensitive minds of such interpretations of human nature can hardly fail to be depressing. Such minds cannot take refuge today in the old Supernaturalism which welcomed and stressed every sort of pessimism about the *natural* man in order that it might exhibit more completely the miraculous power of supernatural grace. Lacking such a refuge they must turn in other directions for relief from their depression. They may simply eat, drink and be merry, that is, escape the pains and sorrows of thought by sinking to a lower, more animal level of life; or they may accept the mood of defeatism as inevitable and console themselves for the lost values by cultivating a poetry and philosophy of imaginative regret and tender melancholy as Joseph Wood Krutch has done; or they may try to achieve a new outlook on life by courageously facing the problem of human nature with a view to reestablishing the old optimism concerning man on more empirical and defensible foundations. The last of these possible methods of escape is the one recommended and attempted here.

(1) *What Is Human Nature?*

We are all prone to believe that because we use a word frequently we know precisely what it means. But such may be far from the case. All our most comprehensive terms have only such meanings as individuals with their varying experience and culture put into them. The term "human nature" is a case in point. We sometimes speak of human nature as though it were an unchanging psychic entity whose behavior could be predicted for decades to come. From this unchanging psychic entity have issued war and greed and lust and cruelty throughout human history and it is vain to hope, so say the pessimists, that the flow can ever be stopped. How often it has been remarked in

the last fifteen years that the Great War had demonstrated once and for all that our so-called civilization, our boasted cultural qualities, were nothing more than polish and veneer. The real man, it has been said, is the man the war showed up; civilized man is only this savage dressed up and taught superficial manners. Civilization is thus interpreted as a mere piece of hypocrisy.

But this is an entirely unpsychological way of regarding the whole matter. The term "human nature" as popularly used has no precise and uniform meaning whatsoever—it needs a thorough analytic overhauling. Even after scientific analysis, no precise meaning can be given to it. There is doubtless something in heredity to justify the conception of human nature as an unchanging psychic entity, but only when interpreted with great caution. The germ-plasm, which is the bearer of the hereditary nature of man, contains a number of well-marked types of instinctive emotional disposition but these dispositions or instincts are not tendencies to do particular things but vague aptitudes that are of no practical use until they are turned in definite directions by education. Professor Cooley (*Human Nature and the Social Order*, p. 19), has illustrated this fact in a very striking way: "Roughly speaking then, the heredity of the other animals is a mechanism like that of a hand-organ: it is made to play a few tunes; you can play these tunes at once, with little or no training and you can never play any others. The heredity of man, on the other hand, is a mechanism more like that of a piano: it is not made to play particular tunes; you can do nothing at all on it without training; but a trained player can draw from it an infinite variety of music."

It may well be that "the original nature of man," the hereditary outfit of impulses, dispositions, aptitudes, lines of teachability, etc., changes, if it changes at all, only very slowly, and this fact may seem to validate the idea of human nature as an unchanging psychic entity. But, after all, human nature as we concretely experience it in ourselves and know it in others is not "the original nature of man," but that nature functioning in response to an environment which it finds ready-made and through social customs, influences, ideas and institutions which

may not be calculated to evoke what is best in it at all. Human nature as a potentiality and human nature as an actuality at any moment of history may be widely different things. As Cooley says, the primary trait of human nature is its teachability. It is not made to play a few fixed tunes but to produce an infinite variety of music. It would be absurd to assume, as John B. Watson seems to do, that anything whatsoever may be done with human nature, for, though its fundamental needs may be satisfied in many ways, it still has fundamental needs. But original human nature is so indefinite, so plastic, so teachable that its attainments at any given moment may be a very meagre index of its total capacities. As the possibilities of the piano have not been exhausted by all the brilliant composers who have used it as their medium of expression, so the capacities of human nature will never be evoked in anything like their full power until we achieve a social order that shall bring a wide range of suitable stimuli to bear upon it. As Cooley says again: "Human nature does not need to change in order to be an inexhaustible source of changing conduct and institutions. We can make it work in almost any way, if we understand it."

For a further elucidation of this point, we might use, as a sort of text, the three following statements: "The potentialities of development in human souls are unfathomable." (William James.) "The potencies of development in man are much greater than the actualities." (Professor Conklin.) "Not one-hundredth of one per cent of the potential powers or abilities of man are at present brought into requisition." (Thomas A. Edison.) The last statement, though uttered by a man who has done so much to harness for man's uses the formerly unknown and unused powers of physical nature, may seem almost fatuous in its optimism. But to a large degree it is substantiated by the findings of several educators in the experimental schools of England and America. Things have been done in those schools that would have been considered impossible a generation ago. Talents have been found to be widespread in common school-children that were not expected to be there.

Take, for example, such a capacity as that for writing poetry. No one had suspected that more than a few children

could be induced or taught to express their thoughts and feelings in verse. But a large proportion of the children in these schools have actually done so. When we turn over the pages of a book by Mr. H. Mearns called *Creative Youth*, which contains many of the poems referred to, we can hardly believe that they were written by such young authors. They display an insight into life that one would not have expected from young people of high-school age. They exhibit a high degree of inventiveness and an undeniable originality. When Mr. Mearns was asked how he explained this wonder, he replied that all he had done was to make the conditions for full self-expression favorable. The natural urge to the creation of beauty is there, even in small children, so Mr. Mearns alleges, only awaiting the conditions that are favorable to it. An English school inspector, Mr. Edmond Holmes, reports in several books but especially in *What Is and What Might Be* a similar creativeness in certain schools in England where unusually favorable conditions were supplied. The same writers report similarly concerning drawing and painting.

But we have more significant evidence still of the variety and richness of endowment to be found in original human nature. Nothing in adult life is sadder than its selfishness and greed. "Man's inhumanity to man makes countless thousands mourn." The acquisitive impulse, gorging itself on the opportunities provided by our competitive system, has turned the social life of Christendom, especially in our own age, into a feverish scramble for possessions and pleasures and finally issued in the appalling disaster of the Great War. When we ask ourselves why life is visited by such disasters, we are apt to lay the blame on original human nature, on the natural selfishness of the human species and on the hair-trigger irritability of the so-called instinct of pugnacity. But the evidence supplied by the experimental schools enables us to give a different answer. These schools, especially those described by Mr. Edmond Holmes, show that when child-nature is allowed to develop without too much repression and mechanical obedience, children show a large capacity for social sympathy, good-fellowship and self-forgetfulness. They do not need to postpone associated living

until their elders supply them with forms of social organization. They show readiness to feel social situations and needs, to originate solutions, to carry responsibilities, to organize and cooperate, to appreciate both justice and generosity and to make self-corrections. In other words, the tendency to altruism,—to a lively interest in others and a disinterested devotion to others—is shown on a large scale among the young just as well as an amazing creativeness in literature, drawing and painting—when the conditions are favorable. If this natural capacity for self-sacrifice or social devotion dies out after adolescence—as our present chaotic and selfish life shows that it does—it is because it is not adequately sustained by the mental influences and the social situations and institutions into which the child is ushered when he reaches adult years and adult responsibilities.

The upshot of these considerations, then, is that we must not blame original human nature for those deplorable elements in our present life that come rather from particular situations and institutions. What original capacities shall be evoked and organized at any one time depends on the total situation by which human nature is confronted. And in the light of this fact we may say that the trouble with modern society is far more nurture than nature. The soul of the human child is a vast complex of potentialities, tendencies and cravings, waiting to unfold themselves in response to the stimulus of environment and education. It is rich in the possibilities of activity, imaginative sympathy, versatile creativeness, self-forgetfulness, disinterested devotion, charm of social manner and joy of heart. But these rich possibilities may be repressed, warped, denied expression and completely discouraged by the type of example and nurture that is supplied them. Our present economic and social organization does not give original human nature a fair chance. Its competitive selfishness, its lust for power, its cruel exploitation of those who cannot defend themselves, its practical materialism, its devastating wars, its sexual immorality and its scandal-mongering present such a startling picture of life that the imagination of the young is almost sure to be powerfully impressed by it, and so long as that picture dominates the mind, every fair virtue must seem impossible. Nor does our present

type of education give original human nature a fair chance either. We are only gradually breaking away from the old doctrine of original sin and wherever that doctrine dictates the attitude to child-nature, education is of inner necessity dogmatic, dictatorial and repressive. It tries to drill moral and spiritual ideals into a child-mind that it conceives to be born in sin and wicked by nature. But such ideals cannot be drilled into the child-mind—they must be evoked from it, and to that end we must take for granted the child's natural goodness, his all-round capacity for associated living and his interest in spiritual activity.

Our answer to the question, what is human nature? may be summed up in a few words. We must not identify human nature with the forms of individual and social life through which it functions at any one moment. It may be selfish, greedy, immoral, quarrelsome and reactionary in one type of situation today and later on in a different situation generous, self-controlled, peaceful and open-minded. Biologically man is the latest comer on the earth and the least stable from a physiological point of view. Any sudden or great change in his physical environment threatens his very existence. And in man his social nature, especially his capacity for living in large groups, is the latest comer among his higher psychic qualities and any great change in his life-conditions quickly throws him off his moral-social balance. We are quite right in lamenting this fact but we are unduly pessimistic when we infer from it the moral evil and impotency of human nature in all possible life situations.

(2) *Freud's Account of Human Nature*

If what was said about original human nature in the preceding section is true, it gives us an excellent criterion for testing the validity of the Freudian doctrine of pansexuality. That human nature, responding to certain stimuli and organized in certain ways, can do terrible things will not be denied by any student of history or observer of contemporary life. It can be cruel, greedy, lustful, vindictive, unfeeling and besotted. But our contention is that these developments are not inevitable. For example, the economic greed which flourishes in an individ-

ualistic and competitive society and the wars which such greed begets need not be read back into original human nature and regarded as inevitable in every conceivable organization of human relations. The roots of these vices are undoubtedly there but they would not have grown into the upas-trees they now are if they had not been abundantly watered and cultivated. So it is with lust. There is much in contemporary life that seems to justify the Freudian doctrine of pansexuality. Man, it has been said, is the only animal that loves all the year round, that is, the natural inhibitions which confine sex among the lower animals to certain seasons have been bred out of the human animal and he gets no rest from the urge of the sex-impulse from the beginning to the end of the year. And not only is the physiological drive more or less constant but man can and does stimulate the natural urge by dwelling on it in imagination and dreaming of its possible satisfactions in ways of which the animals are incapable. Hence sex does possess and obsess the mind of man to an extraordinary degree. It is not astonishing, then, that Freud should impute an enormous importance to sex, trace most, if not all, the neuroses to which man is subject to the frustrations of the sex-impulse and even attempt to derive from it other instincts, such as the ego-impulse, curiosity, pugnacity and economic greed.

But here again we must not ascribe to original human nature sex excesses which may be due to social situations which are by no means inevitable. There is no biological reason for supposing that the physiological urge of sex is any stronger now than in the immediate or remote past. If it is more troublesome today than then, it is because the stimuli that are calculated to evoke it are more numerous and more powerful. And that such is the case can hardly be doubted. It has been discovered by selfish, callous, enterprizing men and women—vice-lords as we call them—that fortunes can be made either by pandering directly to the sex-impulse or by exciting it indirectly through the movie, the play, the vaudeville performance, the story, the song, the dance and the picture, and in every great city a small army of men and women ply the lecherous trade successfully. The sex-situation which confronts the youth of

great cities today is entirely different from that which was faced by the young in the country fifty years ago. Then marriage was economically possible in early life, now it is not; then few artificial incitements to the sex-interest were in existence, now their number is legion; then familiar speech about sex was taboo, both in conversation and in books, now it comes almost as readily as talk about the weather. Explaining the situation thus does not of course do away with it but it gives us real ground for hope if we can convince ourselves that our present sexual looseness and excess are not the outcome of a degenerate heredity, that is, of a vast increase in the natural strength of the sex-urge but rather of a social environment which is not inevitable but may be transformed when enough people are convinced of the need of a change. That conviction, when strongly held, diminishes very materially the *a priori* support which the Freudian doctrine of pansexuality gets from the excessive interest which so many people take today, directly or indirectly, in sex-discussion and sex-experience.

But Freud's doctrine of pansexuality can be combated on more scientific grounds. His attempt to trace back the ego-impulse, curiosity, acquisitiveness and pugnacity to sex or social situations that arise out of sex seems very far-fetched to any one familiar with the tremendous variety of nature. No doubt every one of these impulses displays itself conspicuously in sex-situations—in sex-jealousy the ego-impulse is very active, sex awakens an immense amount of curiosity in young life, the greed for property is often rooted in the desire for display for sex-purposes, pugnacity is easily aroused when the sex-impulse is thwarted. But every one of these impulses is aroused also in connection with other situations. The love of power when thwarted arouses the ego-impulse, jealousy and pugnacity. The struggle for food as well as the struggle for mates arouses the combative impulse. Acquisitiveness is often due far more to the love of power, of economic, political and personal domination over men than to the amorous desire of appearing in fine feathers before members of the opposite sex. It would require far more imaginative ingenuity even than Freud possesses to trace the intellectual curiosity of a Newton, a Darwin, a Pasteur, a

Poincaré or an Einstein back to the inquisitiveness of a little child concerning the mysteries of sex and reproduction. There seems no more reason to trace one fundamental instinctive disposition back to another than to trace the organs of the body back to one another. The eye does not produce the ear nor the ear the nose nor the liver the kidneys nor the stomach the lungs. All of them alike owe their being to the evolutionary struggle of the whole body to function in the most adequate ways possible. They are interdependent and interactive to a degree that baffles even the scientific imagination to describe but there is no sense in saying that one of them creates the other. And similarly no good reason has yet been given for making sex the creative source of all the other impulses and thus securing for it the pre-eminent place in human life. Certainly sex as a means of reproduction is not found in the lower forms of life. Life went on successfully for countless ages without any sex at all. It is by no means as primordial as the struggle for food and that struggle alone was capable of generating the ego-impulse, curiosity, acquisitiveness and pugnacity in any minded organism. Hence the current sexolatry which almost deifies the function of sex and which is a natural outcome of the Freudian doctrine of pansexuality, attributes to it an importance out of all proportion to the other factors in the total evolutionary ongoing of human life, personal and social. Charlotte Perkins Gilman will hardly be accused of being a reactionary in these matters but this is what she says (*Sex in Civilization*, p. 115): "Preoccupied with the phenomena of sex, both normal and abnormal, we have at last come to a distinct philosophy which assumes it to be the main governing force of life, seconded only by the demands of nutrition. Such a philosophy obscures and delays our recognition of the real nature and purpose of social life. Real race progress, which has moved from a scant and meager, scattered and disconnected existence, to the present degree of racial and inter-racial organization, is as detached from sex-influence as if it were in a fourth dimension. Social evolution has developed quite other instincts and proceeded along quite other paths, than those associated with the desire of the male for the female, or the desire of the

female for economic advantage. . . . Whether we look at sex as a simple physical phenomenon or as of the highest psychic development in noble emotion, it remains an individual affair; whereas civilization, in all its advance, stagnation or collapse, is a social affair." If we follow out such a line of thought as Mrs. Gilman has here indicated, we may overcome the influence of the current sexolatry over our own minds and come to her conclusion that "the area of extra-sexual interest becomes larger and larger with the advance of civilization."

A very few words will suffice for the phase of the Freudian doctrine of pansexuality known as the Oedipus Complex. That such a thing as incestuous desire has existed is shown by the many taboos against incest to be found among both primitive and later peoples. But the Freudian explanation of incestuous desire need not be regarded as the only possible one. That sex is implicit in the child from the start and gives a tone to its life; that the male child is attached to the mother and the female to the father; that sons sometimes develop a violent hatred towards their fathers and daughters a jealousy of their mothers—all these affirmations are entirely credible. But that suckling the breast and thumb-sucking yield sexual pleasure rather than nutritional satisfaction; that every boy because of his early familiarity with the mother's body experiences a desire for incest with his mother and hates his father because the latter interferes with the realization of his desire; that the infantile sex-impulses are suppressed by social taboos and at about the sixth year become latent until puberty; that these repressed infantile sex-tendencies form the nucleus of the unconscious; that the Oedipus Complex is not only the dominant factor in family relationships, but is also at the bottom of society, morality and religion—all these statements of the Freudian psychology need more proving than has yet been forthcoming. Direct observation of the child at the mother's breast and during the years when there is necessarily much bodily *rapprochement* between them fails to yield adequate evidence; the problem of explaining the genesis of the complex in the female child has not been solved; the theory that sex becomes latent from the sixth year on until puberty is in direct conflict with the evidence advanced by

genetic psychology; such anthropologists as Goldenweiser (Early Civilization, pp. 396-7) repudiate the sociological application of the theory; and when we learn that the evidence for the whole theory is drawn mainly from the analysis of the dreams of neurotic adults and when we recall that the historical fact of incest can be explained as due to the unwise conduct of parents themselves, the theory loses most of its prestige and of its influence over our minds. It may be true that Freud "has forced us all to dig more critically, explore more candidly into human morals and human conduct and to break down sham by tearing away its cloak shame" (Dr. Myerson), but the specific theories by which he has interpreted his findings need all the critical overhauling that they are now receiving.

(3) *The Behavioristic Interpretation of Human Nature*

If Behaviorism is a Battleline, as the title of a recent book declares, it is impossible to do justice to it here in the brief space at our disposal. But the reader who desires further exposition and criticism may turn to that book, especially to the chapters by McDougall, Josey and Centner or to the much more subtle criticism in the relevant sections of Bertrand Russell's *Philosophy*. McDougall in the essay referred to gives us what is perhaps the neatest exposition and criticism of Behaviorism as a psychology of conduct and knowledge that we have. He says it is erected on the three feet of a tripod—the so-called 'Sarbon' theory of Thorndike, the conditioned reflex of Pavlov and the idea of a *tabula rasa*, that is, the denial of all innate capacities, aptitudes and talents except a number of 'Sarbons.' He then proceeds to subject these bases of Behaviorism to very effective criticism, making use especially of recent investigations and articles by Dr. D. K. Adams and Dr. K. S. Lashley. But our concern here is with more general criticism.

Common sense as well as the modern theory of Emergent Evolution in all its forms may be urged against the reductive or leveling-down tendency of Behaviorists. McDougall phrases their formula thus: "If you wish to understand man, even the highest and best that is in him and his works, study mice and guinea-pigs, or better still, the amoeba and paramecia." Russell

sums up Watson's philosophy in the following playful way: "Descartes says: I think, therefore I am; Watson says: There are rats in mazes, therefore I don't think." This surely is a belated method of studying human nature. What human nature is or at least is capable of is to be seen best in its greatest creative activities such as poetry, drama, music, painting, architecture, science, philosophy, invention, social institutions and moral heroisms. To say that these conscious creative activities have played no significant part in human history is so great an affront to our common sense that it is difficult to treat seriously those who make such a statement. If man is to be explained and not explained away, we must emphasize that which differentiates him from rats in mazes rather than what he has in common with them. Obviously Behaviorism fits in far better with the reductive evolutionism of Spencer than with the Emergent Evolution of Bergson, Morgan, Smuts and Jennings. As Russell says: "Watson's position seems to rest upon naive realism as regards the physical world, but naive realism is destroyed by what physics itself has to say concerning physical causation." In other words, Watson tries to explain human nature in the terms of an antiquated physics.

Another aspect of Behaviorism will seem especially absurd to those who have had dramatic and significant moral experiences. It teaches that all modification of human nature is brought about by the acquiring of new conditional reflexes by many repetitions of the same stimulus. This is really untrue, because an intelligent adaptation is often effected by a single sudden flash of insight, but we may let that pass. So great is Watson's faith in his power to modify human nature by conditioned reflexes that he boldly undertakes to produce any type of man desired without the painful struggles of self-discipline and self-development. To the historian who knows something of the inner struggles of the great moral heroes of history, Watson's promise will seem much like the old advertisement of "Pink Pills for Pale People," warranted to cure all diseases. There can be no doubt that many of the moral struggles of the great heroes of the past were in part due to the painful conflicts engendered in their minds by the pressure of false and artificial

moral inhibitions and traditions. But after full allowance is made for this, it must be contended that no original moral genius is likely, in any conceivable society of the near future, to achieve self-development without conscious struggle, painful inner conflict and heroic administration of self-discipline. We are not dogs to be trained to perform tricks but human beings to be provided with opportunities for self-discovery, self-discipline and self-realization.

One further criticism of considerable importance may be advanced. Behaviorism claims to be more objective than previous psychologies and, because of this objectivity, more capable of predicting and controlling the future. But it gains any reputation for objectivity it may have simply by narrowing its field of observation. It treats everything that is not directly observable, that is, smellable, touchable, seeable, audible, etc., as unreal for any scientific purpose. Nothing but what can be recorded by an instrument is of any scientific importance. And it claims on the basis of these facts objectively observed to be able to foretell and to influence the conduct of men. But these claims are surely extravagant. No mechanical instrument can record those inner subjective states from which, as our indubitable experience assures us, much of our conduct springs—our love, hate, fear, hope, courage, pain, pleasure, loyalty and aspiration. If we believe that man has certain instinctive dispositions that must find some sort of satisfaction if life is to be tolerable, we can predict what he will do when these dispositions are thwarted, but Behaviorism, having no such belief and being obliged to explain human conduct as a mechanical response to the environment, has no means of telling beforehand what the response to any future environment may be. When we know what a man's beliefs are, what attitudes he takes to the great human interests, what values he pursues, we can foretell fairly accurately what his conduct will be in any normal situation that is likely to arise, but Behaviorism has no interest in belief, attitudes and values and cannot fall back upon them for the purpose of predicting conduct.

It would seem, then, that the cloud of depression which settled down on sensitive minds when the first bold frontal at-

tack of Behaviorism caught them unprepared and half convinced them of its truth by its showy claim of rigid scientific objectivity, is likely to lift and be dispersed. Behaviorism is itself a product of human nature in one of its ever-recurring adolescent moods of scorn for all ineffective idealisms, for all pleasures save those of the senses, for all oppressive and merely traditional moralisms and for all insights, speculations, intuitions, visions, etc., except those which can be checked by instruments and scientific logic. But such moods do not last forever and in the very science of physics itself we are witnessing today a type of thinking for which the old materialism in which Behaviorism is rooted is as dead as pre-Darwinian biology is for the biologist.

(4) *Man Versus the Universe*

The close of an article already long is no place to discuss such a topic as Man Versus the Universe. It is introduced here for two reasons: in the first place, to remind the reader that no defense of human nature can be complete unless it somehow succeeds in rooting man and his values in the cosmic process and thus overcomes the dualism between the cosmic process and the moral process to which Huxley gave such powerful expression a generation ago; and in the second place, to afford the writer the pleasure of using a quotation from Bertrand Russell which may not be as familiar to some readers as other quotations from him are. No one has expressed the sense of man's littleness when set over against the universe with more eloquence and poignancy than Bertrand Russell. Everyone is familiar with the moving paragraph with which he closes his essay on Ethics in the volume called *Ideals of Science and Faith* and which begins with the words: "Brief and powerless is man's life; on him and all his race the slow, sure doom falls pitiless and dark. Blind to good and evil, reckless of destruction, omnipotent matter rolls on its relentless way, etc." But since that paragraph was written, a larger and riper wisdom has come to him. Professor George Meade once introduced him to a University of Chicago audience as "the most exciting mind in the world today." Certainly he is not bothered by any foolish craving for consistency with past statements and in his book entitled *Philosophy*

(pp. 300-1), he strikes a note which will be reassuring to many who have been deeply disturbed by his earlier utterances. "The physical world so far as science can show at present, is perhaps less rigidly determined by causal laws than it was thought to be. . . . There is no need to think of ourselves as powerless and small in the grasp of vast cosmic forces. All measurement is conventional. . . . No doubt there are limits to our power, and it is good that we should recognize the fact. But we cannot say what the limits are, except in a quite abstract way, such as that we cannot create energy. From the point of view of human life, it is not important to be able to *create* energy; what is important is to be able to direct energy into this or that channel, and this we can do more and more as our knowledge of science increases. Since men first began to think, the forces of nature have oppressed them; earthquakes, floods, pestilences and famines have filled them with terror. Now at last, thanks to science, mankind is discovering how to avoid much of the suffering that such events have hitherto entailed. The mood in which, as it seems to me, the modern man should face the universe is one of quiet self-respect. The universe as known to science is not in itself either friendly or hostile to man, but it can be made to act as a friend if approached with patient knowledge. . . . The dangers to man in the future, or at least in any measurable future, come, not from nature, but from man himself." Obviously there is no robust religious faith such as the active religious consciousness yearns for involved in this statement, but at any rate it represents a long step forward from the despairing utterances of his earlier years. And when it is combined with even more constructive statements by such men as Jeans, Eddington, Whitehead, Millikan and other physicists, we may confidently predict that we are entering upon an era of postulation in ultimate matters which will make it easier for the religious consciousness to affirm its inner needs and convictions than at any time during the last two or three decades.

The Meadville General Catalogue

GENERAL CATALOGUE of the Meadville Theological School, 1844-1930. Compiled by Clayton R. Bowen. The Beacon Press. 183 pp. \$1.00.

Just in time to qualify as a product of 1930, the new General Catalogue of the Meadville Theological School was published by the Beacon Press late in December. It is the third general catalogue of the School, the two preceding issues bearings the dates 1910 and 1920.

The earlier catalogues were the compilation of the Rev. Walter Cox Green, now Librarian Emeritus of the School; the present volume represents the research of many months of Dr. Clayton R. Bowen, Librarian, as well as Professor of New Testament. In books of this character, it is to be expected that each succeeding volume will be fuller and more accurate than those preceding; and the present catalogue fulfills the expectation. Without Mr. Green's work as a foundation, the preparation of the 1930 edition, as the compiler acknowledges, would have been well-nigh impossible; with that foundation, however, the present volume not only brings the record of the School's graduates and former students up to date, but corrects many hitherto unavoidable errors and adds information not previously available.

The book consists of a record of practically all of those who studied in the School from its foundation in Meadville, Pennsylvania, in the Fall of 1844, until Commencement Day in Chicago in the Spring of 1930. In most of the records the essential dates of the subject's career are set down; in many of them reference is made to more extended available biographical material. In those instances where no information is given, it will usually be noticed that the student was at Meadville for a short time only, and evidently did not enter the ministry. Containing, as it does, brief and authentic sketches of many of those influential in the development of the liberal religious movement in America for eighty-six years, it will be invaluable as a book of reference to all interested in that movement.

The catalogue lists 886 names. Of these, 398 are the names of graduates. Many of those who for some reason did not qualify for graduation, especially in the earlier days of the School, entered the ministry and made honorable places in the profession. The Meadville Theological School, from the beginning, has been open on equal terms to women as well as men; but no women took advantage of the privilege until the entrance of the Class of 1873. Since that time 58 women have studied at the School. Only two of these are now active in the ministry; but a number of Meadville women in the past have had ministerial appointments. Twenty-seven of the women students are recorded as married, eighteen of them to fellow students.

The "oldest living graduate" of the School is Charles Wentworth Buck of the Class of 1862, now living, at ninety-seven years of age, in Cambridge, Massachusetts. He was graduated A. B. from Amherst in 1855. He retired from the ministry in 1879. Close behind him are two men who have won unusual distinction in their profession,—Dr. Charles W. Wendte, identified principally with the organization of religious liberals on an international basis; and Dr. Edward A. Horton, Minister Emeritus of the Second Church in Boston and Chaplain Emeritus of the Massachusetts Senate. Dr. Wendte, who studied at Meadville in 1866-67, is now eighty-six; Dr. Horton, of the Meadville Class of 1868, is eighty-seven years of age.

The story which the book sets forth, although told principally by names and dates, is one of which the School may be proud. To those who are able, by personal acquaintance with some of the men and by knowledge of their work, to fill in the background, the story is a thrilling one.

The Catalogue, bound in heavy paper, will be forwarded, postpaid, to any one who will send the purchase price, \$1.00, to the Meadville Theological School, 5701 Woodlawn Avenue, Chicago. It is on sale at the Book Room, 25 Beacon Street, Boston, Massachusetts. A limited number of copies in more durable binding may be had at \$1.50 a copy.

SYDNEY B. SNOW.

Two Hymns of Thanksgiving

Out of five hymns written by students of the Meadville Theological School for the annual Thanksgiving Service, November 26, 1930, the first of the two following was selected by the judges to be sung at the service, and the second was given honorable mention.

I

TUNE: AUSTRIA

Spirit of eternal gladness,
Ours the joy of seeking thee,
Striving in an age of sadness
For the things that make men free:
Free from self and war's dominion,
Free to struggle hand in hand
For the greater love and vision
Needed to redeem our land.

Thanks to thee for saint and prophet,
Righteousness their flaming sword,
Making level in the desert
Highways for the feet of God:
For the thunder of their wisdom
Beating strongly in our ears,
Calling us to seek thy kingdom
And fulfill the faith of years.

For the joy of brave companions
Pressing forward by our side,
For the hills and stars and oceans,
Healing pain, rebuking pride—
Thine the earth and thine the fulness,
Thou the giver, thine the gift:
Spirit of eternal gladness,
One to thee our hearts we lift!

ARTHUR NEWELL MOORE.

II

TUNE: CAMDEN

For beauty of the autumn sun
That gently shines through branches bare,
For coming winter's promises
Of a new landscape, white and fair.

For happy homes where children play,
For man's devotion, woman's love,
For sacramental peace, and hope
That bids us toward the future move.

For all the city's weary toil,
For faithful ploughing of the land,
For student's searching, poet's dream,
For artist's brush and craftsman's hand.

For every toiler of our time,
For all the past's great bounty given,
We thank our God, who giveth man
The joy of building his own heaven.

ELIZABETH GLASS.

All communications to the MEADVILLE JOURNAL should be sent to the editor, Robert J. Hutcheon, 5701 Woodlawn Ave., Chicago.

